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Abstract
In frictionless financial markets, no-arbitrage is a local property in time. This means
that a discrete time model is arbitrage-free if and only if there does not exist a one-period-
arbitrage. With capital gains taxes, this equivalence fails. For a model with a linear tax
and one non-shortable risky stock, we introduce the concept of robust local no-arbitrage
(RLNA) as the weakest local condition which guarantees dynamic no-arbitrage. Under a
sharp dichotomy condition, we prove (RLNA). Since no-one-period-arbitrage is necessary
for no-arbitrage, the latter is sandwiched between two local conditions, which allows us to
estimate its non-locality.
Furthermore, we construct a stock price process such that two long positions in the
same stock hedge each other. This puzzling phenomenon that cannot occur in arbitrage-free
frictionless markets (or markets with proportional transaction costs) is used to show that
no-arbitrage alone does not imply the existence of an equivalent separating measure if the
probability space is infinite.
Finally, we show that the model with a linear tax on capital gains can be written as a
model with proportional transaction costs by introducing several fictitious securities.
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1 Introduction
In most countries, trading gains have to be taxed, which constitutes a major market friction. Tax
systems are usually realization based, i.e., gains on assets are taxed when assets are sold and not
when gains actually accrue. Consequently, investors hold various tax timing options. Especially
in the case of positive interest rates and direct tax credits for losses, there is an incentive to
realize losses immediately and defer the realization of profits (the latter is called a lock-in effect).
Without further restrictions, there can even exist a tax-arbitrage by simultaneously holding both
a long and short position in the same risky stock. Accordingly, a loss is realized when it accrues
to declare it to the tax office, although the liquidated position is immediately rebuilt (cf., e.g.,
Constantinides [5] or Dammon and Green [7]). A popular approach in the literature – which
we also follow in the current paper – is to exclude this trivial tax arbitrage opportunity by not
∗Institut fu¨r Mathematik, Goethe-Universita¨t Frankfurt, D-60054 Frankfurt a.M., Germany, e-mail:
ckuehn@math.uni-frankfurt.de
I would like to thank the editor, Prof. Riedel, and an anonymous associate editor for their valuable comments. I am
especially grateful to the anonymous referee for finding a minor error in the previous version of Proposition 2.15
and for many valuable suggestions that lead to a substantial improvement of the presentation of the results.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
06
38
6v
3 
 [q
-fi
n.P
M
]  
26
 Se
p 2
01
8
allowing for short positions in risky stocks. At least for retail investors, this is not an unrealistic
restriction (see, e.g., Dybvig and Ross [9] for a detailed discussion).
Of course, in practice there are restrictions on negative tax payments and the way in which
losses can be offset against gains. In some tax systems, losses can only be used to avoid the
payment of positive taxes on gains which are realized in the same year. In other systems, losses
can also be carried forwards in time. Besides progressive tax rates, these restrictions are an-
other source of nonlinearity that calls for a local arbitrage theory as developed in Ross [21] and
Gallmeyer and Srivastava [11]. The concepts differ in detail, but the basic idea is as follows:
the investor does not start – as usual in arbitrage theory – without an endowment and tries to
attain a portfolio with nonnegative liquidation value, which is positive with positive probability.
By contrast, an arbitrage is a strategy that is added to another endowment and leads at least
to the same liquidation value, albeit with a positive probability to a strictly higher one.
Another practical restriction is the prohibition of so-called wash sales. A wash sale is a sale
with the aim to declare a loss to the tax office, but the security is immediately repurchased. In
the US, a declaration of a loss is not possible if “substantially identical” securities are purchased
within 30 days after the liquidation of the loss-making security. Under a limited use of losses or
the prohibition of wash sales, and a positive interest rate, Gallmeyer and Srivastava [11] show
that in a static Arrow-Debreu security model (i.e., in a model without redundant securities), no
pre-tax arbitrage implies no local after-tax arbitrage. Under some parameter restrictions, similar
results are obtained for the multi-period binomial model including dividends that are taxed at
a different rate.
A different approach to the dynamic arbitrage theory with taxes is followed in Auerbach and
Bradford [1] and Jensen [14] who consider more general “stock value based” linear tax rules that
do not need to be realization based, i.e., taxes may depend on the mark-to-market valuation
of stock positions and not only actually-obtained prices. For these tax rules, Jensen [14]
characterizes the subset of “valuation neutral” tax systems. This means that he starts with a
martingale measure for a tax-exempt investor in a multi-period model and characterizes all
“stock value based” linear tax systems under which the same measure consistently valuates the
after-tax wealth of all dynamic trading strategies. This leads to an interesting decomposition
of a linear tax into a tax on the locally riskless interest and a risk sharing component of the
government for the “risky part” of the investment. The investor’s gains are decomposed into
the interest if her whole capital was invested in the riskless bank account and the gains if her
actual investments were financed by a short position in the bank account. The decomposition
depends on the riskless interest rate. This means that in general, the taxes on the gains
achieved by investing the entire capital in a risky stock depend on the riskless interest rate.
These tax systems are also “holding period neutral”, which means that the holding periods
of the shares do not have an impact on investors’ selling decisions and consequently, the tax
options described above are worthless. Especially the permission of short positions in the risky
stock does not lead to tax arbitrage. A crucial role in [1] and [14] is played by a tax account
for accrued but not yet realized gains, on which interest is paid. The interest payment makes
the difference compared with the common real-world tax systems described above. Indeed,
the separating measures that are derived in the current article depend on the tax rate. Of
course, from a practical perspective, non-realization-based tax systems have many drawbacks.
For the mark-to-market valuation, a lot of information is required that is unavailable for less
liquid stocks. In addition, even if taxes on book profits do not need to be payed immediately
but rather at stock’s liquidation time with interest, it is easy to construct examples in which
tax liabilities for gains on a stock exceed its liquidation price, which can cause a liquidity problem.
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In the current article, we discuss the dynamic arbitrage theory under a linear realization-
based capital gains tax. Linearity implies that we allow for negative tax payments (immediate
tax refunds) triggered by the realization of losses. However, it is important to note that our
results can still be applied mutatis mutandis to more complicated tax systems. On the one
hand, no-arbitrage in our model implies no-arbitrage under more restrictive rules. On the other
hand, an arbitrage with the full use of losses induces a local arbitrage in the sense of Definition 1
in Ross [21] for, e.g., a model in which gains and losses in a portfolio can only be offset within the
same year. For this, one can consider an investor who receives sufficient annual dividends against
which losses can be offset and consequently gains from additional investments are actually taxed
linearly.
The restriction to linear taxes implies that in a one-period model, pre-tax and after-tax
arbitrage strategies coincide. This allows us to focus the analysis on the dynamic component of
the problem, i.e., the impact of tax timing options on the no-arbitrage conditions. For further
discussions on linearity as a “desiderandum of a tidy tax system”, we refer to Bradford [4].
In a dynamic framework, the after-tax no-arbitrage property is substantially stronger than
the pre-tax no-arbitrage property. Most importantly, in frictionless market models, no-arbitrage
is a local property in time. This means that in a discrete time model, the possibility to make
a riskless profit can be checked period by period, solely based on the current stochastic asset
returns, which is of course an immense reduction of the complexity. If there does not exist a one-
period arbitrage – i.e., an arbitrage strategy that only invests during one predetermined period
– there is also no dynamic arbitrage. By contrast, in models with proportional transaction costs
or capital gains taxes, no-one-period-arbitrage is strictly weaker than no-arbitrage. In the first
case, this is rather obvious since transaction costs may take some time to amortize (cf., e.g.,
Example 4.1 in [20]). With taxes, assets which allow the deferment of taxes on book profits
become more profitable compared with interest- or dividend-paying investments, especially for
a long investment horizon (see, e.g., Black [3] for a general discussion on the “sub-optimality of
dividend payments” and [18] for conditions on the stochastic stock price dynamics under which
this widely held view holds true).
The aim of the current article is to quantify how non-local the no-arbitrage property is
in models with capital gains taxes. For this purpose, we introduce the concept of robust local
no-arbitrage (RLNA) as the weakest local condition which guarantees dynamic no-arbitrage.
The condition is local in time, i.e., it can be verified period by period, solely based on the
current stochastic stock return and without the knowledge of the stock price returns outside the
current period. Robustness refers to the fact that (RLNA) in the period under consideration
guarantees dynamic no-arbitrage whatever the stock price is “reasonably” extended outside
this period. More precisely, one considers all extensions which are arbitrage-free if the stochastic
returns of the period under consideration are eliminated and requires that the stock price process
including this period remains arbitrage-free. Put differently, this demonstrates which stochastic
stock returns in one period can trigger an arbitrage in a multi-period model.
On the other hand, no-one-period-arbitrage is also a local property, and it is necessary
(rather than sufficient) for dynamic no-arbitrage. This means that no-arbitrage is sandwiched
between two local criteria. Thus, with a sufficient local condition for (RLNA) at hand and a
characterization of no-one-period-arbitrage models (which does not depend on the tax rate),
we can estimate how non-local the no-arbitrage property is in models with taxes. The sufficient
local condition is the main result of the paper (Theorem 2.12). It can be seen as a generalization
of the simple dichotomy condition in a frictionless market with one non-shortable risky stock,
which says: given any information at the beginning of a period, there is either the risk that the
stochastic return falls below the riskless interest rate, or one knows for sure that it does not
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exceed the riskless interest rate.
In tax models, the same phenomenon can occur as in models with proportional transaction
costs, see Schachermayer [23], which is impossible in frictionless markets by the Dalang-Morton-
Willinger theorem [6]: on an infinite probability space, discrete time no-arbitrage alone does not
imply the existence of an equivalent separating measure. We provide an explicit example for this
in the tax model with a bank account and one risky stock (Example 4.5). In the example, the set
of attainable terminal wealths is not closed regarding the convergence in probability. By contrast,
for multi-period proportional transaction costs models with only 2 assets (e.g., a bank account
and one risky stock), it is proven by Gigoriev [12] that no-arbitrage already implies the existence
of a separating measure. For a detailed discussion, we refer to the monograph of Kabanov and
Safarian [17]. For our example, we use a price process constructed in Example 4.3 such that two
long positions in the same stock hedge each other. This puzzling phenomenon cannot occur in
arbitrage-free frictionless markets or – more generally – markets with proportional transactions
costs (see Remark 4.4). This hedging (im)possibility makes the difference between the situation
in Gigoriev’s theorem and Example 4.5. Using the idea behind Example 4.5, we provide a two-
period example for an approximate arbitrage in an arbitrage-free transaction costs model with
a bank account and 2 risky stocks (see Example 4.6). We discuss the relation to the original
counterexample, Example 3.1 in Schachermayer [23], that demonstrates the same phenomenon
in a one-period transaction costs model with 4 assets.
Finally, we show that the tax model can be written as a model with proportional transaction
costs by introducing several fictitious securities. We provide a sufficient condition that guar-
antees the existence of a separating measure, and the set of separating measures is characterized.
In the analysis of the paper, we consider the so-called exact tax basis or specific share
identification method, which corresponds, e.g., to the tax legislation in the US and seems
economically the most reasonable tax basis. Here, an investor who wants to reduce her position
in an asset can freely choose which of the securities of the same kind in her portfolio (i.e.,
which Apple stocks) are relevant for taxation. Although all of these securities possess the same
market price, they generally have different purchasing prices which matters for the taxation.
Other common tax bases are the first-in-first-out rule and an average of past purchasing prices
(see Jouini, Koehl, and Touzi [15, 16] and Ben Tahar, Soner, and Touzi [2], respectively,
for solutions of portfolio optimization problems under these tax bases). Both Theorem 2.12
and Example 3.20, dealing with the optimality of the dichotomy condition, also hold for the
first-in-first-out tax basis and the average tax basis. The proof of the theorem needs some
adjustments, but the method to consider sets like (3.18) also works here. Since this would
require a lot of additional notation, we restrict ourselves to the exact tax basis.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the concept
of robust local no-arbitrage (RLNA), relate it to no-arbitrage (NA) and state the main result of
the article (Theorem 2.12). The proofs can be found in Section 3. In Section 4, examples of the
aforementioned phenomena are provided. In Section 5, the tax model is related to models with
proportional transactions costs, and the set of separating measures is characterized. The article
ends with a conclusion.
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2 No-arbitrage and robust local no-arbitrage in the model of
Dybvig/Koo
Throughout the article, we fix a finite time horizon T ∈ N and a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t=0,1,...,T , P ). There is one non-shortable risky stock with price process S =
(St)t=0,1,...,T where St ∈ L0+(Ω,Ft, P ). Following the notation in Dybvig and Koo [8], Ns,u ∈
L0+(Ω,Fu, P ) denotes the number of stocks that are bought at time s ∈ {0, . . . , T} and kept
in the portfolio at least after trading at time u ∈ {s, . . . , T}. Especially, Ns,s is the number of
shares purchased at time s, i.e., a position cannot be purchased and resold at the same time. On
the other hand, a position can be sold and rebought at the same time, which is called a wash
sale. For simplicity, we do not exclude wash sales, but this does not have a major impact on the
main results as discussed in Remark 4.7. One has the constraints
Ns,s ≥ Ns,s+1 ≥ . . . ≥ Ns,T = 0 for all s ∈ {0, . . . , T}, (2.1)
which contains a short-selling restriction and a forced liquidation at T . The random variable
ηu ∈ L0(Ω,Fu, P ) denotes the number of monetary units after trading at time u. There exists
a riskless interest rate r ∈ R+ \ {0}. The tax rate satisfies α ∈ [0, 1), i.e., unless otherwise
mentioned, the tax-exempt case is included. For simplicity, the interest on the bank account
is taxed immediately. This means that the bank account grows with the after-tax interest rate
(1− α)r.
Definition 2.1. A process (η,N) with N satisfying (2.1) and η = (ηu)u=0,1,...,T , where ηu ∈
L0(Ω,Fu, P ), is called self-financing for zero initial capital iff
ηu − ηu−1 = (1− α)rηu−1 −Nu,uSu +
u−1∑
s=0
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)(Su − α(Su − Ss)), u ≥ 0, (2.2)
where η−1 := 0. A self-financing strategy (η,N) with zero initial capital is an arbitrage iff
P (ηT ≥ 0) = 1 and P (ηT > 0) > 0. If no such strategy exists, the market model satisfies
no-arbitrage (NA).
Remark 2.2. If the model satisfies (NA), the same model with a tax-exempt investor (i.e.,
with α = 0) also satisfies (NA). Indeed, if the tax-exempt model allowed for an arbitrage, then
there would exist a one-period-arbitrage. This is also a one-period-arbitrage after taxes. But, for
T ≥ 2, the converse does not hold. Consider St = (1 + r)t. By the deferment of positive taxes, a
long position in the stock, along with a short position in the bank account, leads to an arbitrage.
Definition 2.3. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. An arbitrage in the sense of Definition 2.1 is a one-period-
arbitrage in period t if Ns,u = 0 for all (s, u) 6= (t − 1, t − 1). This means that P (ηT ≥ 0) = 1
and P (ηT > 0) > 0 with
ηT = (1− α)Nt−1,t−1 (St − St−1 − rSt−1) (1 + (1− α)r)T−t.
Note 2.4. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T} with P (St−1 > 0) = 1. For α ∈ [0, 1), there is no one-period-
arbitrage in period t iff
P
(
P
(
St − St−1
St−1
< r | Ft−1
)
> 0 or P
(
St − St−1
St−1
≤ r | Ft−1
)
= 1
)
= 1. (2.3)
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The proof is straightforward. In a one-period model, pre-tax and after-tax arbitrage strategies
obviously coincide. Consequently, (2.3) is a necessary local condition for dynamic no-arbitrage
with taxes, i.e., a condition that only depends on the stochastic return (St − St−1)/St−1 in
period t.
Note 2.5. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and R ∈ L0(Ω,Ft, P ), R ≥ −1, such that
P (P (R < r | Ft−1) > 0 or P (R ≤ r | Ft−1) = 1) = 1. Then, there exists an adapted process
(Su)u=0,...,T with P (St−1 > 0) = 1, (St − St−1)/St−1 = R, and S satisfies (NA).
Proof. Consider Su = 1 for u ≤ t− 1, St = 1 +R, and Su = 0 for u ≥ t+ 1. 
By Note 2.5, “no-one-period-arbitrage in t” is the strongest local property, i.e., a property
that only depends on the stochastic return (St − St−1)/St−1 in period t, which can be derived
from dynamic no-arbitrage with taxes. Put differently, from (NA) one can only derive properties
that are satisfied by all stochastic returns with the “no-one-period-arbitrage in t” property.
Thus, (2.3) is the best necessary local condition for (NA).
As a counterpart, we introduce a sufficient local condition that gurantees (NA). This means
for every period t, we again look for a condition that only depends on the stochastic return in
period t.
Definition 2.6 (Robust local no-arbitrage (RLNA)). Given a filtered probability space, a non-
negative adapted stock price process S satisfies (RLNA) in period t ∈ {1, . . . , T} iff P (St−1 =
0, St > 0) = 0 and for all nonnegative adapted processes Ŝ = (Ŝu)u=0,1,...,t−1,t+1,...,T acting on the
restricted time domain {0, 1, . . . , t−1, t+1, . . . , T}, the following implication holds. If Ŝ satisfies
(NA) in the model with restricted time domain {0, 1, . . . , t− 1, t+ 1, . . . , T} (see Definition 2.9
below for the precise definition of the model), then S˜ = (S˜u)u=0,1,...,T defined by
S˜u :=

Ŝu : u ≤ t− 1
Ŝt−1 StSt−1 : u = t
Ŝu
St
St−1 : u ≥ t+ 1,
(2.4)
with the convention 0/0 := 0, also satisfies (NA).
S satisfies (RLNA) iff it satisfies (RLNA) in every period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Remark 2.7. If P (St−1 = 0, St > 0) > 0, there is a trivial one-period arbitrage with after-tax
gain (1 − α)St1{St−1=0}. Excluding this case, zero is an absorbing state of the asset price and
later investment opportunities in the asset disappear.
Remark 2.8. (RLNA) can be interpreted as follows. The stochastic return in period t, i.e.,
(St − St−1)/St−1, cannot trigger an arbitrage – regardless of how the process behaves in other
periods. To formalize this property, one considers all processes with the same stochastic return
as S in period t which are arbitrage-free after eliminating the returns of period t. One requires
that all of these processes remain arbitrage-free with period t. The property is local in time since
only the return in period t enters (although it obviously depends on the time horizon and the
whole filtered probability space). Put differently, the stock return of period t pasted together with
arbitrary returns forming an arbitrage-free process without period t should lead to an arbitrage-
free process. This justifies the term “robust”. By construction, (RLNA) is in the sense described
above the weakest local condition that guarantees (NA).
For α = 0, it is equivalent to (NA), but for α > 0, it is nevertheless surprisingly strong (see
Proposition 2.11(ii) and Example 4.2, resp.).
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To be as general as possible, Definition 2.6 allows that S takes the value zero with positive
probability albeit that holds minor relevance. For S > 0, S˜ can easily be interpreted as the wealth
process of a self-financing portfolio of a tax-exempt investor buying one stock at price Ŝ0, selling
it at price Ŝt−1 to invest the reward during t− 1 and t in S and to repurchase Ŝ at time t.
It remains to formalize the elimination of period t. The idea is that the time between t− 1
and t is eliminated, and consequently gains accruing in this period – in both the stock and the
bank account – disappear. On the other hand, the information that is available for the decision
on the investment during the next period remains the same as in the original model.
Definition 2.9 (Elimination of period t). The model with eliminated period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
and price process (Ŝu)u=0,1,...,t−1,t+1,...,T is defined as follows. A strategy is given by N =
(Ns,u)s,u∈{0,...,t−1,t+1,...,T},s≤u satisfying (2.1) without time t, where Ns,u is Fu-measurable if
u 6= t− 1 and Ns,t−1 is Ft-measurable. In the self-financing condition (2.2), the increments of η
between t− 1 and t and between t and t+ 1 disappear and are replaced by
ηt+1 − ηt−1 = (1− α)rηt−1 −Nt+1,t+1Ŝt+1 +
t−1∑
s=0
(Ns,t−1 −Ns,t+1)(Ŝt+1 − α(Ŝt+1 − Ŝs)). (2.5)
(Of course, in the special case t = T , one requires Ns,T−1 = 0 for s = 0, . . . , T − 1, and the
liquidation value is given by ηT−1 instead of ηT , i.e., (2.5) does not apply)
(2.5) means that the interest between t − 1 and t + 1 is rηt−1, i.e., since the time between
t− 1 and t is eliminated, interest is only paid for one time unit. Notionally, the investor has to
close her stock position at unit price S˜t−1 and repurchase at price S˜t per share. To make this
procedure self-financing, the fraction St−1/St of the position at time t− 1 is repurchased. This
motivates the pasting of the price process in (2.4).
The assumption that Ns,t−1 has only to be Ft-measurable is quite natural: the decision on
the investment in Ŝt+1 − Ŝt−1 can be conditioned on the information Ft. This means that the
elimination of the time between t−1 and t has no impact on the information that is available for
the decision on the investment during the next period. For S > 0, the investment opportunities
between t and t+ 1 are the same in the markets Ŝ and S˜.
Remark 2.10. A simpler way to eliminate period t from the model would be that the investor
has to liquidate her stock positions at time t−1 and may rebuild them at time t. This would lead
to a stronger (RLNA)-condition since in the model without period t, taxes could not be deferred
beyond t − 1. This may even turn sure losses in the stock during period t into “good deals”.
However, we think that this would be the wrong condition since the addition of a period in the
inner of the time domain should not be the reason why taxes can be deferred over this point.
Proposition 2.11. We have that
(i) For α ∈ [0, 1), (RLNA) ⇒ (NA)
(ii) For α = 0, (RLNA) ⇔ (NA)
In the following, we provide a sufficient condition for (RLNA). Example 4.2 shows that it is
sharp in some sense.
Theorem 2.12. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and assume that
P (St−1 = 0, St > 0) = 0 (2.6)
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and
P
(
P
(
St − St−1
St−1
< κt,T | Ft−1
)
> 0 or P
(
St − St−1
St−1
≤ (1− α)r | Ft−1
)
= 1
)
= 1, (2.7)
where
κt,T :=
(−α+ (1− α)2r) (1 + (1− α)r)T−t + α
(1 + (1− α)r)T−t − α , (2.8)
again with the convention 0/0 := 0. Then, S satisfies (RLNA) in period t.
Condition (2.7) is a dichotomy: given any information at time t− 1, there is either the risk
that the stochastic return in period t falls below κt,T or one knows for sure that it does not
exceed (1−α)r. It turns out that both scenarios make it impossible that the addition of period t
to an arbitrage-free model induces an arbitrage.
The boundary κt,T is chosen small enough such that in the case that it is undershot, the loss
in period t dominates the benefit from possible tax defers from t−1 to T . Upon first glance, κt,T
may look unnecessarily small to guarantee (RLNA); namely, taxes on gains accrued up to time
t− 1 can also be deferred to T in the comparison model Ŝ with eliminated period t, which has
to be arbitrage-free by definition. However, since one only requires that κt,T is undershot with
positive probability, there can be a gain in period t. This gain could be used to hedge against a
bad outcome in the market after t and allow for an arbitrage in the model including period t.
In Example 4.2, we construct such a market. The example satisfies (2.8) only with a larger
boundary κ < r and does not satisfy (RLNA).
Remark 2.13. Putting α = 0, (2.7) reduces to (2.3) that is necessary and sufficient for “no-
one-period-arbitrage in t”, both with and without taxes (see Note 2.4).
Remark 2.14. Putting Note 2.5 and Remark 2.8 together, (NA) for some α ∈ [0, 1) is sand-
wiched between two local conditions, which are the best necessary and sufficient local conditions
in the sense described above. In addition, by Theorem 2.12, (2.7) guarantees (RLNA), and it is
sharp in some sense (see Examples 4.2). Thus, comparing the bounds in (2.7) and (2.3) provides
a good estimate of how non-local the no-arbitrage property is under taxes (see the conclusion).
Proposition 2.15. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and assume that (2.6) and
P
(
St − St−1
St−1
≤ (1− α)r | Ft−1
)
> 0, P -a.s. (2.9)
hold for all t = 1, . . . , T , again with the convention 0/0 := 0. Then, the model satisfies (NA).
Remark 2.16. Condition (2.9) means that the investor can never be sure that the pre-tax
profit in the stock strictly exceeds the after-tax profit in the bank account. This ensures that the
deferment of taxes on profits in the stock cannot be used to generate an arbitrage.
On the other hand, for α = 0 – which is excluded in Proposition 2.15 – (2.9) is an even
strictly weaker condition than (NA).
3 Proofs
The following quantities prove useful in all proofs. For every pair (s, u) with s < u, the after-tax
gain at time T of the self-financing investment in the stock S between s and u is given by
Xs,u := [Su − α(Su − Ss)] (1 + (1− α)r)T−u − Ss(1 + (1− α)r)T−s, s < u. (3.1)
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It is immediate that for any self-financing strategy (η,N) with zero initial capital, the liquidation
value ηT , that is uniquely determined by N , can be written as
V (N) := ηT =
T−1∑
s=0
T∑
u=s+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)Xs,u. (3.2)
For price process S˜ instead of S, X˜s,u and V˜ (N) are defined accordingly. In the market with
smaller time domain {0, . . . , t − 1, t + 1, . . . , T} and stock price process Ŝ (cf. Definition 2.9),
these quantities read
X̂s,u :=
[
Ŝu − α(Ŝu − Ŝs)
]
(1 + (1− α)r)T−u−1(u≤t−1)
−Ŝs(1 + (1− α)r)T−s−1(s≤t−1) , s, u 6= t, s < u, (3.3)
and
V̂ (N) :=
T−1∑
s=0, s 6=t
 T∑
u=s+1, u 6=t, u 6=t+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)X̂s,u + (Ns,t−1 −Ns,t+1)X̂s,t+1
 . (3.4)
Proof of Proposition 2.11. Ad (i): Assume that (St)t=0,...,T does not satisfy (NA) and let
t := min {u ∈ {1, . . . , T} | ∃ arbitrage (η,N) with P (Ns,l = 0) = 1 for all l ≥ u} .
This means that t is the smallest number u such that the model with liquidation time u, i.e., all
stock positions have to be liquidated up to time u, allows for an arbitrage. Let us show that S
does not satisfy (RLNA) in period t. W.l.o.g. P (St−1 = 0, St > 0) = 0, since otherwise (RLNA)
does not hold by definition. We consider the process Ŝ acting on the time domain {0, . . . , t−1, t+
1, . . . , T} and being defined by Ŝu := Su1(u≤t−1). The corresponding S˜ from (2.4) coincides with
S on {0, . . . , t} that allows for an arbitrage. Thus, it remains to show that Ŝ satisfies (NA) in the
model from Definition 2.9. By S ≥ 0 and r > 0, one has that X̂s,u ≤ (1 + (1− α)r)−1Xs,u∧(t−1)
for all s ≤ t − 2, u 6= t, X̂t−1,u ≤ 0 for all u ≥ t + 1, and X̂s,u = 0 for all s ≥ t + 1. For every
strategy N in the market Ŝ, this implies
V̂ (N) =
t−1∑
s=0
 T∑
u=s+1, u 6=t, u 6=t+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)X̂s,u + (Ns,t−1 −Ns,t+1)X̂s,t+1

≤ 1
1 + (1− α)r
[
t−2∑
s=0
t−2∑
u=s+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)Xs,u +
t−2∑
s=0
Ns,t−2Xs,t−1
]
, (3.5)
using that Ns,T = 0. The RHS of (3.5) can be generated in the market with price process S and
liquidation time t − 1. But, by the minimality of t, S does not allow for an arbitrage if stock
positions have to be liquidated up to time t−1. Thus, (3.5) implies (NA) for Ŝ, and we are done.
Ad (ii): It remains to show “⇐”. Of course, for α = 0, (2.2) reduces to the standard self-
financing condition in frictionless markets. Assume that S does not satisfy (RLNA) in some
period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. If P (St−1 = 0, St > 0) > 0, S allows for an arbitrage, and we are done.
Thus, we can assume that there is a process Ŝ satisfying (NA), but the corresponding S˜ from
(2.4) allows for an arbitrage. Since α = 0, there is some u ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that S˜ allows for
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a one-period-arbitrage in period u, i.e., between u− 1 and u (see the proof of Proposition 5.11
in Fo¨llmer and Schied [10], which also holds under short-selling constraints in some assets). By
construction of the model in Definition 2.9, for u ∈ {1, . . . , T} \ {t}, a one-period arbitrage of S˜
in u induces a one-period arbitrage of Ŝ (Note that for u = t + 1, a one-period arbitrage of S˜
would induce an arbitrage between t − 1 and t + 1 in the model with eliminated period t. For
this one needs the relaxation that Ns,t−1 is only Ft-measurable in the model with Ŝ). But, since
Ŝ satisfies (NA), it follows that u = t, and S also allows for a one-period arbitrage in t. 
Proof of Theorem 2.12. Let Ŝ be some arbitrary nonnegative adapted price process satisfying
(NA) in the model from Definition 2.9 with the time domain {0, . . . , t− 1, t+ 1, . . . , T} and let
S˜ be the associated process defined in (2.4) that acts on {0, . . . , T}. We observe that
P
(
Ŝt−1 = 0, Ŝu > 0 for some u ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T}
)
= 0. (3.6)
Furthermore, throughout the proof, we fix a strategy N in the market S˜ on the time do-
main {0, . . . , T}. We have to show that N cannot be an arbitrage, i.e., S˜ also satisfies (NA).
Step 1: Define
B1 :=
{
Ŝt−1 = 0
}
∪
{
P
(
St − St−1
St−1
≤ (1− α)r | Ft−1
)
= 1
}
.
Let us first show that there exists a strategy N̂ in the market Ŝ on {0, . . . , t − 1, t + 1, . . . , T}
(cf. Definition 2.9) such that N̂s,u = Ns,u for all s ≤ u ≤ t− 2 and
V̂ (N̂) ≥ 1
1 + (1− α)r V˜ (N) on B1 ∪
{
t−1∑
s=0
Ns,t−1 = 0
}
P -a.s., (3.7)
where V̂ and V˜ are defined as in (3.4) and (3.2), respectively. We define (N̂s,u)s≤u, s,u 6=t by
N̂s,u := Ns,u, s ≤ t− 2, u 6= t− 1
N̂s,t−1 := Ns,t, s ≤ t− 2
N̂t−1,t−1 := Nt−1,t +
1
1 + (1− α)r
St
St−1
Nt,t
N̂t−1,u := Nt−1,u +
1
1 + (1− α)r
St
St−1
Nt,u, u ≥ t+ 1
N̂s,u :=
1
1 + (1− α)r
St
St−1
Ns,u, s ≥ t+ 1.
Note that N̂s,t−1 has only to be Ft-measurable. N̂t−1,t−1 is the number of stocks which are
purchased at price Ŝt−1, i.e.,“between t − 1 and t + 1” in the model with the smaller time
domain. These purchases have to mimic the sum of purchases at price S˜t−1 and S˜t in the model
with the larger time domain.
On the set
{∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 = 0
}
, the stock positions in the market S˜ are completely liquidated
at t − 1 and no new shares are purchased at time t − 1. (2.1) yields that on this set one has
Ns,u = 0 for all s ≤ t− 1, u ≥ t− 1, and thus, V˜ (N) reduces to
V˜ (N) =
t−2∑
s=0
t−1∑
u=s+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)X˜s,u +
T−1∑
s=t
T∑
u=s+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)X˜s,u. (3.8)
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By construction of N̂ , on the above set, one has N̂s,u = 0 for all s ≤ t− 2, u ≥ t− 1, N̂t−1,t−1 =
1/(1 + (1 − α)r)St/St−1Nt,t, and N̂t−1,u = 1/(1 + (1 − α)r)St/St−1Nt,u for all u ≥ t + 1. This
yields a similar simplification as in (3.8):
V̂ (N̂) =
t−2∑
s=0
t−1∑
u=s+1
(N̂s,u−1 − N̂s,u)X̂s,u +
T∑
u=t+1
1
1 + (1− α)r
St
St−1
(Nt,u−1 −Nt,u)X̂t−1,u
+
T−1∑
s=t+1
T∑
u=s+1
(N̂s,u−1 − N̂s,u)X̂s,u. (3.9)
For s ≤ t − 2, u ≤ t − 1, one has N̂s,u−1 − N̂s,u = Ns,u−1 − Ns,u, X̂s,u = X˜s,u/(1 + (1 − α)r),
and thus (N̂s,u−1 − N̂s,u)X̂s,u = (Ns,u−1 − Ns,u)X˜s,u/(1 + (1 − α)r). On the other hand, N̂
yields the same gain in the submarket Ŝ on {t− 1, t+ 1, t+ 2 . . . , T} as N in the submarket S˜
on {t, t + 1, t + 2, . . . , T} up to the prefactor 1/(1 + (1 − α)r). Since both gains disappear on
the set {St = 0}, we only have to check this assertion on the set {St > 0}, which coincides
P -a.s. with {St−1 > 0, St > 0} by assumption. For s ≥ t + 1, u > s, we have N̂s,u−1 − N̂s,u =
1/(1 + (1 − α)r)St/St−1(Ns,u−1 − Ns,u), X̂s,u = St−1/StX˜s,u, and thus (N̂s,u−1 − N̂s,u)X̂s,u =
1/(1+(1−α)r)(Ns,u−1−Ns,u)X˜s,u. In addition, one has X̂t−1,u = St−1/StX˜t,u. Putting together,
the “corresponding” summands in (3.8) and (3.9) coincide up to the prefactor 1/(1 + (1− α)r),
which implies that (3.7) is satisfied with equality on
{∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 = 0
}
.
Now, we analyze the gains on B1, which is of course the interesting part. Without the
assumption that
∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 = 0, one needs estimates for the gains X˜s,u with s ≤ t − 1 and
u ≥ t. We obtain that
X˜s,u =
[
(1− α)S˜u + αS˜s
]
(1 + (1− α)r)T−u − S˜s(1 + (1− α)r)T−s
≤
[
(1− α)(1 + (1− α)r)Ŝu + αŜs
]
(1 + (1− α)r)T−u − Ŝs(1 + (1− α)r)T−s
≤ (1 + (1− α)r)
([
(1− α)Ŝu + αŜs
]
(1 + (1− α)r)T−u − Ŝs(1 + (1− α)r)T−s−1
)
= (1 + (1− α)r)X̂s,u P -a.s. on B1, s ≤ t− 1, u ≥ t+ 1, (3.10)
in which for the estimate on the set {Ŝt−1 = 0} we use that {Ŝt−1 = 0} ⊂ {Ŝu = 0, S˜u = 0},
P -a.s. by (3.6) and the construction of S˜. With the same estimation, it follows
X˜s,t ≤
[
(1− α)(1 + (1− α)r)Ŝt−1 + αŜs
]
(1 + (1− α)r)T−t − Ŝs(1 + (1− α)r)T−s
≤ (1 + (1− α)r)X̂s,t−1 P -a.s. on B1, s ≤ t− 2 (3.11)
and
X˜t−1,t ≤ 0 P -a.s. on B1. (3.12)
Without the assumption that
∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 = 0, the RHSs of (3.8) and (3.9) still coincide up to
the prefactor 1/(1 + (1− α)r), but there appear the additional summands
t−1∑
s=0
T∑
u=t
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)X˜s,u (3.13)
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and
t−1∑
s=0
T∑
u=t+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)X̂s,u +
t−2∑
s=0
(Ns,t−1 −Ns,t)X̂s,t−1 (3.14)
for V˜ (N) and V̂ (N̂), respectively. By (3.10) and (3.11), each summand in (3.14) dominates its
“corresponding” summand in (3.13) up to the prefactor 1/(1 + (1 − α)r) on the set B1. The
summand (Nt−1,t−1 − Nt−1,t)X˜t−1,t in (3.13) is left, but by (3.12) it is nonpositive on B1, and
we arrive at (3.7).
This means that if the pre-tax stock return in period t certainly does not exceed (1 − α)r,
an elimination of period t would always be desirable for the investor. Note that an elimination
means that she can defer taxes without being invested in period t, and she need not pay interest
on her debts in period t.
Step 2: Define
B2 :=
{
Ŝt−1 > 0
}
∩
{
St−1 > 0, P
(
St − St−1
St−1
< κt,T | Ft−1
)
> 0
}
.
Note that by (2.6) and the convention 0/0 := 0, we have that {St−1 = 0} ⊂ B1, P -a.s. Thus, we
get by assumption (2.7) that
P (B1 ∪B2) = 1. (3.15)
On B2 the following decomposition plays a crucial role. For s ≤ t− 1, u ≥ t, we decompose
X˜s,u into four parts: the gain when liquidating the stock at t−1, the gain after repurchasing the
stock at time t, the wealth generated by deferring the tax on gains accrued up to time t− 1 to
time u, and the profit in period t taxed at time u. Formally, the decomposition is also defined for
s < u with s > t− 1 or u < t, but then it degenerates, i.e., Is,u3 = Is,u4 = 0. The decomposition
reads X˜s,u = I
s,u
1 + I
s,u
2 + I
s,u
3 + I
s,u
4 , where
Is,u1 :=
[
(1− α)S˜u∧(t−1) + αS˜s∧(t−1)
]
(1 + (1− α)r)T−u∧(t−1) − S˜s∧(t−1) (1 + (1− α)r)T−s∧(t−1) ,
Is,u2 :=
[
(1− α)S˜u∨t + αS˜s∨t
]
(1 + (1− α)r)T−u∨t − S˜s∨t (1 + (1− α)r)T−s∨t ,
Is,u3 := α
[
S˜u∧(t−1) − S˜s∧(t−1)
] [
(1 + (1− α)r)T−u∧(t−1) − (1 + (1− α)r)T−u
]
,
Is,u4 := 0 for s > t− 1 or u < t and otherwise
Is,u4 := S˜t (1 + (1− α)r)T−t − S˜t−1 (1 + (1− α)r)T−(t−1) − α(S˜t − S˜t−1) (1 + (1− α)r)T−u .
By S˜ ≥ 0, we have that
Is,u3 + I
s,u
4 (3.16)
≤ αS˜t−1
[
(1 + (1− α)r)T−(t−1) − (1 + (1− α)r)T−u
]
+S˜t (1 + (1− α)r)T−t − S˜t−1 (1 + (1− α)r)T−(t−1) − α(S˜t − S˜t−1) (1 + (1− α)r)T−u
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for all s ≤ t−1, u ≥ t. By S˜t ≥ 0, the RHS of (3.16) takes its maximum at u = T , which implies
Is,u3 + I
s,u
4 (3.17)
≤ I
:= αS˜t−1
[
(1 + (1− α)r)T−(t−1) − 1
]
+S˜t (1 + (1− α)r)T−t − S˜t−1 (1 + (1− α)r)T−(t−1) − α(S˜t − S˜t−1)
≤ αS˜t−1
[
(1 + (1− α)r)T−(t−1) − 1
]
+S˜t−1
[
(1 + κt,T ) (1 + (1− α)r)T−t − (1 + (1− α)r)T−(t−1) − ακt,T
]
< 0 on
{
Ŝt−1 > 0, St−1 > 0,
St − St−1
St−1
< κt,T
}
for s ≤ t− 1, u ≥ t.
(3.17) can be seen as the key estimate of the proof. It implies that on the event B2 ∈ Ft−1, there
is the risk that the loss in period t dominates the benefit from deferring taxes over period t. The
estimate holds simultaneously in s ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1} and u ∈ {t, . . . , T}.
Now define
Vi :=
∑
(s,u), s<u
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)Is,ui , i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The terminal wealth V˜ (N) is given by V˜ (N) = V1 + V2 + V3 + V4. First note that V1 is Ft−1-
measurable, which can be seen by writing it as
V1 =
∑
s, s<t−1
 ∑
u, u>s, u<t−1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)Is,u1 +Ns,t−2Is,t−11
 .
We also consider
W :=
∑
(s,u), s≤t−1, u≥t
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)I = I
∑
s, s≤t−1
Ns,t−1.
By (3.17), one has W ≥ V3 + V4 everywhere, and in contrast to V3 + V4, W is Ft-measurable.
Step 3: Now, we prepare a case differentiation to complete the proof. Define
M̂N :=
{
A ∈ Ft−1 | ∃N̂ on {0, . . . , t− 1, t+ 1, . . . , T} such that (3.18)
N̂s,u = Ns,u P -a.s. ∀s ≤ u ≤ t− 2 and P (V̂ (N̂) ≥ 0 | Ft−1) = 1 on A P -a.s.
}
,
MN :=
{
A ∈ Ft−1 | ∃N˜ on {0, . . . , T} such that N˜s,u = Ns,u P -a.s. ∀s ≤ u ≤ t− 2
and P (V˜ (N˜) ≥ 0 | Ft−1) = 1 on A P -a.s.
}
,
M̂N := esssup M̂N (i.e., 1
M̂N
= esssup {1A | A ∈ M̂N}), and MN := esssup MN (3.19)
Of course, the essential supremum of the family of functions {1A | A ∈ M̂N} is {0, 1}-valued,
which allows the definitions (3.19), cf., e.g., Remark 1.14 of [13].
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Let us show that the suprema in (3.19) are attained, i.e.,
M̂N ∈ M̂N (3.20)
(and of course the same with MN , although not needed). Indeed, by general properties of the
essential supremum, there exists a sequence (An)n∈N ⊂ M̂N such that ∪n∈NAn = M̂N P -a.s
(cf., e.g., Remark 1.14 of [13]). Let N˜ (n) be corresponding strategies with N˜
(n)
s,u = Ns,u P -a.s. for
all s ≤ u ≤ t− 2 and P (V˜ (N˜ (n)) ≥ 0 | Ft−1) = 1 on An P -a.s. Now, one paste these strategies
together by defining N˜s,u := Ns,u for u ≤ t−2, N˜s,u :=
∑∞
n=1 1An\(A1∪...∪An−1)N
(n)
s,u for u ≥ t−1
(and of course, s ≤ u). This yields (3.20).
The set M̂N ∈ Ft−1 is the event that the strategy N “before t − 1” can be extended to a
strategy in the market {0, . . . , t − 1, t + 1, . . . , T} that does not make a loss. In arbitrage-free
frictionless markets, this condition would be equivalent to the non-negativity of the liquidation
value at t − 1. But, by the deferment of taxes, it can happen that a negative liquidation value
becomes positive for sure with the passing of time. Note that in (3.18), one has u ≤ t − 2 and
not u ≤ t− 1. This means that given the information Ft−1, trades at time t− 1 can differ from
N , e.g., all stock positions can be liquidated at t− 1.
From (3.7) and B1 ∈ Ft−1, it follows that
MN ∩B1 ⊂ M̂N ∩B1 P -a.s. (3.21)
Now, we distinguish four cases, that may overlap, but include everything due to (3.15), to
show that N cannot be an arbitrage.
Case 1: P
(
B2 ∩
{∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 > 0
})
= 0.
By (3.15), one has P
(
B1 ∪
{∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 = 0
})
= 1. Then, by (3.7), there exists an N̂ in
the market {0, . . . , t − 1, t + 1, . . . , T} with P (V̂ (N̂) ≥ V˜ (N)/(1 + (1 − α)r)) = 1. Since the
market {0, . . . , t− 1, t+ 1, . . . , T} satisfies (NA), N cannot be an arbitrage.
Case 2: P
(
B2 ∩
{∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 > 0
})
> 0 and P (M̂N ) = 1.
By (3.20), there exists an N̂ with N̂s,u = Ns,u P -a.s. for all s ≤ u ≤ t − 2 and P (V̂ (N̂) ≥
0) = 1. If the event {V1 > 0} ∈ Ft−1 had a positive probability, the strategy N̂ ′ defined by
N̂ ′s,u := Ns,u for u ≤ t − 2 and N̂ ′s,u := 1{V1≤0}N̂s,u for u ≥ t − 1 would be an arbitrage since
V̂ (N̂ ′) = 1{V1>0}V1+1{V1≤0}V̂ (N̂). Thus, since the market {0, . . . , t−1, t+1, . . . , T} is arbitrage-
free by assumption, we must have that P (V1 ≤ 0) = 1. By {
∑t−1
s=0Ns,t−1 > 0} ∈ Ft−1 and (3.17),
one has
0 < P
(
t−1∑
s=0
Ns,t−1 > 0, Ŝt−1 > 0, St−1 > 0,
St − St−1
St−1
< κt,T
)
≤ P (W < 0). (3.22)
Since {W < 0} ∈ Ft, the random gain 1{W<0}V2 can also be generated in the submarket with
price process (Ŝu)u=t−1,t+1,t+2,...,T , in which initial purchases have only to be Ft-measurable.
Since this submarket is arbitrage-free, (3.22) implies that P (W + V2 < 0) > 0 and thus
P (V˜ (N) < 0) > 0.
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Case 3: P ((Ω \ M̂N ) ∩B2) > 0.
By choosing N̂s,u := Ns,u for u ≤ t − 2 and N̂s,u := 0 for u ≥ t − 1, it can be seen that
{V1 ≥ 0} ∈ M̂N . Thus, Ω \ M̂N ⊂ {V1 < 0} P -a.s. and P ({V1 < 0} ∩ B2) > 0. This together
with {V1 < 0} ∈ Ft−1 and (3.17) implies that
0 < P
(
V1 < 0, Ŝt−1 > 0, St−1 > 0,
St − St−1
St−1
< κt,T
)
≤ P (V1 < 0,W ≤ 0).
Then, again by the Ft-measurability of V1 +W and the no-arbitrage property of the submarket
with price process (Ŝu)u=t−1,t+1,t+2,...,T , one arrives at P (V1 + W + V2 < 0) > 0 and thus
P (V˜ (N) < 0) > 0.
Case 4: P ((Ω \ M̂N ) ∩B1) > 0.
By (3.21), one has P (Ω \MN ) > 0. On the other hand, by the maximality of MN , one has
Ω\MN ⊂ {P (V˜ (N) < 0 | Ft−1) > 0} P -a.s. Putting together, we arrive at P (V˜ (N) < 0) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.15. Assume that (2.6) and (2.9) hold.
Step 1: Define As := {St ≤ (1 + (1− α)r)St−1, ∀t = s+ 1, . . . , T}. Let us show that
P (As | Fs) > 0 P -a.s. (3.23)
by backward-induction in s = T −1, T −2, . . . , 0. For s = T −1, the assertion is already included
in (2.9). s ; s − 1: We have As−1 = As ∩ {Ss ≤ (1 + (1 − α)r)Ss−1}. Let C ∈ Fs−1 with
P (C) > 0. By (2.9), this implies that
P (C ∩ {Ss ≤ (1 + (1− α)r)Ss−1})
= E
(
E
(
1C1{Ss≤(1+(1−α)r)Ss−1} | Fs−1
))
= E (1CP (Ss ≤ (1 + (1− α)r)Ss−1 | Fs−1)) > 0. (3.24)
Together with C ∩ {Ss ≤ (1 + (1− α)r)Ss−1} ∈ Fs and the induction hypothesis, (3.24) implies
that
P (C ∩As−1) = E(1C∩{Ss≤(1+(1−α)r)Ss−1}P (As | Fs)) > 0,
and we are done.
Let s < t. On As, the liquidation value at time t of a stock purchased at time s satisfies
St − α(St − Ss) ≤ Ss (1 + (1− α)r)t−s − α
(
(1 + (1− α)r)t−s − 1)Ss
≤ Ss (1 + (1− α)r)t−s − α(1− α)rSs,
and thus
Xs,t ≤ −α(1− α)rSs(1 + (1− α)r)T−t < 0 on As ∩ {Ss > 0} for all t ≥ s+ 1, (3.25)
where X is defined in (3.1). On the other hand, by (2.6), one has
Xs,t = 0 on {Ss = 0} P -a.s. for all t ≥ s+ 1. (3.26)
Step 2: Now, let N be some arbitrary strategy in the stock with liquidation value V (N) from
(3.2). Define the stopping time
τ := inf{s ≥ 0 | Ns,s > 0 and Ss > 0} ∧ T.
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Case 1: P (τ = T ) = 1. Either the strategy does not trade at all or only at a vanishing stock
price. To see this, define τ ′ := inf{s ≥ 0 | Ns,s > 0} ∧ T . We have Sτ ′ = 0, P -a.s. on {τ ′ < T}.
By (2.6), this implies that St = 0 for all t = τ
′, τ ′ + 1, . . . , T , P -a.s. on {τ ′ < T}. Thus, N
satisfies (Ns,u−1−Ns,u)Xs,u = 0 for all s = 0, . . . , T − 1, u = s+ 1, . . . , T , P -a.s. and cannot be
an arbitrage.
Case 2: P (τ = T ) < 1. (3.23) implies that
P (A) > 0, where A := {τ < T} ∩ {St ≤ (1 + (1− α)r)St−1 ∀t = τ + 1 . . . , T}.
Note that {τ < T} ⊂ {Nτ,τ > 0, Sτ > 0}. By (3.25), we get Xτ(ω),t(ω) < 0 for all t ≥ τ(ω) + 1
and ω ∈ A. Together with Nτ,t−1−Nτ,t ≥ 0 for all t ≥ τ + 1 and
∑T
t=τ+1(Nτ,t−1−Nτ,t) = Nτ,τ ,
this implies that
T∑
t=τ(ω)+1
(Nτ(ω),t−1(ω)−Nτ(ω),t(ω))Xτ(ω),t(ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ A. (3.27)
On the other hand, we have that for all pairs (s, t) with s < t
(Ns,t−1 −Ns,t)Xs,t ≤ 0 on A, P -a.s. (3.28)
Indeed, by (3.26), it remains to consider the case that Ss(ω) > 0. If in addition Ns,t−1(ω) −
Ns,t(ω) > 0, then τ(ω) ≤ s and (3.28) follows from (3.25). From (3.27) and (3.28), one obtains
V (N) < 0 on A. Thus, N cannot be an arbitrage. 
4 (Counter-)Examples
In the examples, we have α ∈ (0, 1), F = 2Ω, and all states have a positive probability. In
addition, the following simple observations prove useful in many places.
Note 4.1. (i) Let R ∈ R+ and the real number r¯ is given by
(1 +R)(1 + r¯)(1− α) + α = [(1 +R)(1− α) + α] (1 + (1− α)r). (4.1)
Then, one has r¯ ∈ ((1− α)r, r], where r¯ = r iff R = 0, and for every R′ > R,
(1 +R′)(1 + r¯)(1− α) + α > [(1 +R′)(1− α) + α] (1 + (1− α)r). (4.2)
(ii) Let n ∈ N0 and the real number R is given by
(1 +R)(1− α) + α = (1 + (1− α)r)n. (4.3)
Then, there exists an r¯ ∈ R+ with
(1 +R)(1 + r¯)(1− α) + α < (1 + (1− α)r)n+1, (4.4)
but
(1 +R)(1 + r¯)2(1− α) + α > (1 + (1− α)r)n+2. (4.5)
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(iii) Let r1 ∈ R+ and m1,m2 ∈ N with m1 ≤ m2. We have the implication
(1 + r1)
m1(1− α) + α ≥ (1 + (1− α)r)m1 =⇒ (1 + r1)m2(1− α) + α ≥ (1 + (1− α)r)m2 .
Proof. Ad (i): From (4.1), it follows that r¯ > (1−α)r. Since, the difference of the LHSs of (4.2)
and (4.1) reads (R′ −R)(1 + r¯)(1− α), and the difference of the RHSs is given by (R′ −R)(1−
α)(1 + (1− α)r), one arrives at (4.2).
Ad (ii): Let R be given by (4.3) and define r¯ through equality in (4.4). This implies that
(4.1) is satisfied. Applied to R′ given by 1 +R′ = (1 +R)(1 + r¯), assertion (i) yields (4.5). The
assertion follows by choosing r¯ slightly smaller such that (4.5) still holds.
Ad (iii): Let m0 := inf {m ∈ N | (1 + r1)m(1− α) + α ≥ (1 + (1− α)r)m}. The infimum is
finite iff r1 > (1− α)r. We can assume this since otherwise there is nothing to show. One has
(1 + r1)
m0−1(1 + r1)(1− α) + α = (1 + r1)m0(1− α) + α
≥ (1 + (1− α)r)m0
≥ [(1 + r1)m0−1(1− α) + α] (1 + (1− α)r),
which implies that for R = (1 + r1)
m0−1 − 1 the corresponding r¯ from (4.1) satisfies
r¯ ≤ r1. (4.6)
Now, we are in the position to show by induction that
(1 + r1)
m0+k(1− α) + α ≥ (1 + (1− α)r)m0+k, ∀k ∈ N0,
which completes the proof. Assume that the assertion holds for some k ∈ N0. We derive that
(1 + r1)
m0+k+1(1− α) + α = (1 + r1)m0+k(1 + r1)(1− α) + α
≥ (1 + r1)m0+k(1 + r¯)(1− α) + α
>
[
(1 + r1)
m0+k(1− α) + α
]
(1 + (1− α)r)
≥ (1 + (1− α)r)m0+k+1.
Here, the first inequality holds by (4.6), the second by part (i) applied to R = (1 + r1)
m0−1 − 1
and R′ = (1 + r1)m0+k − 1, and the third by the induction hypothesis. 
Note 4.1 allows for the following economic interpretation. Consider a stock position whose
ratio between the unrealized book profit and the pre-tax value reads R/(1 + R). Then, the
number r¯ in (4.1) is the minimal deterministic return in the next period such that it is
worthwhile to hold the stock for one more period instead of liquidating it immediately. For
R′ > R, the ratio R′/(1 +R′) is larger than R/(1 +R), and the above break-even point for the
stock return of the next period decreases.
The first example of this section is about a boundary κ < r larger than κt,T from (2.8) s.t
P ((St − St−1)/St−1 < κ | Ft−1) > 0 P -a.s., but (RLNA) in t does not hold. This means that
the risk of a loss larger than −κSt−1 does not make it impossible that a long stock position in
period t triggers an arbitrage.
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Example 4.2 (On the maximality of κt,T ). Let t, T ∈ N with 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and Ω = {ω1, ω2}.
The outcome ω is revealed at time t, i.e., Fu = {∅,Ω} for u ≤ t− 1 and Fu = 2Ω for u ≥ t. Let
κ be a boundary satisfying
κ >
(1− α) [(1 + (1− α)r)T − α]
[(1 + (1− α)r)t−1 − α] [(1 + (1− α)r)T−t − α] − 1. (4.7)
The RHS of (4.7) tends to κt,T for t, T → ∞ and T − t fixed. In the following, we construct a
stochastic stock return with P ((St−St−1)/St−1 < κ | Ft−1) > 0, but S does not satisfy (RLNA)
in t.
We assume that St(ω1) = St−1(ω1)(1 + r2) and St(ω2) = St−1(ω2)(1 + r2) with parameters
r2 < r2 that still have to be specified. To show that S does not satisfy (RLNA) in t, one has
to find a process Ŝ which satisfies (NA) in the model from Definition 2.9 with the time domain
{0, . . . , t− 1, t+ 1, . . . , T} such that the corresponding S˜ from (2.4) allows for an arbitrage. We
consider
Ŝu(ω) :=

(1 + r1)
u : u ≤ t− 1
(1 + r1)
t−1(1 + r3)u−t : u ≥ t+ 1, ω = ω1
(1 + r1)
t−1 : u ≥ t+ 1, ω = ω2
where the parameters r1, r3 > 0 are also not yet specified. The associated process S˜ reads
S˜u(ω) =

(1 + r1)
u : u ≤ t− 1
(1 + r1)
t−1(1 + r2)(1 + r3)u−t : u ≥ t, ω = ω1
(1 + r1)
t−1(1 + r2) : u ≥ t, ω = ω2
In the following, we state four conditions from which we then show that they can be satisfied
simultaneously by a suitable choice of the parameters r1, r2, r2, and r3. Later on, we show that
Ŝ satisfies (NA) and S˜ allows for an arbitrage under these conditions that read:
(1 + r1)
t−1(1− α) + α < (1 + (1− α)r)t−1 no-arbitrage up to t− 1, (4.8)
(1 + r3)
T−t(1− α) + α < (1 + (1− α)r)T−t no-arbitrage after ω is revealed, (4.9)
(1 + r1)
t−1(1 + r2)(1 + r3)
T−t(1− α) + α
> (1 + (1− α)r)T profit by buy-at-0-and-sell-at-T if ω1 occurs, (4.10)
and
(1 + r1)
t−1(1 + r2)(1− α) + α
> (1 + (1− α)r)t profit by buy-at-0-and-sell-at-t if ω2 occurs. (4.11)
By (4.7), there exists an r2 < κ with
(1 + r2)
[
(1 + (1− α)r)t−1 − α] [(1 + (1− α)r)T−t − α] > (1− α) [(1 + (1− α)r)T − α] .(4.12)
Fixing such an r2, one can find r1 and r3 such that (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10) hold simultaneously.
Indeed, if r1 and r3 were defined through equality in (4.8) and (4.9), respectively, then (4.10)
would be just a reformulation of (4.12). Now, one chooses r1 and r3 slightly smaller s.t. (4.10)
still holds.
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After these parameters are already specified, by r1 > −1, one can choose r2 large enough
such that (4.11) holds. Putting, together inequalities (4.8)-(4.11) can be satisfied simultaneously.
Let us show that Ŝ satisfies (NA). We consider the gains defined in (3.3). By (4.8) and
Note 4.1(iii), one has
(1 + r1)
n(1− α) + α < (1 + (1− α)r)n, ∀n ∈ N with n ≤ t− 1. (4.13)
Since the stock’s return vanishes on {ω2} after t− 1, we get
X̂s,u(ω2) =
[
(1 + r1)
u∧(t−1)−s∧(t−1)(1− α) + α− (1 + (1− α)r)u−s−1(s≤t−1<u)
]
× (1 + (1− α)r)T−u−1(u≤t−1) < 0, s, u 6= t, s < u, (4.14)
where the inequality follows from (4.13). On the other hand, by (4.9) and again Note 4.1(iii),
one has that
X̂s,u(ω1) =
[
(1 + r3)
u−s∨t(1− α) + α− (1 + (1− α)r)u−s∨t]
× (1 + (1− α)r)T−u < 0, t− 1 ≤ s < u. (4.15)
Now, let N be some arbitrary strategy in the market {0, . . . , t−1, t+1, . . . , T} with V̂ (N) ≥ 0, cf.
(3.4). From (4.14) it follows that Ns,u−1(ω2) −Ns,u(ω2) = 0 for all s < u and thus Ns,s(ω2) =∑T
u=s+1(Ns,u−1(ω2) − Ns,u(ω2)) = 0. Since Ft−2 is trivial, this implies that Ns,s = 0 for all
s ≤ t − 2. In addition, Ns,s = 0 for all s ≥ t − 1 by (4.15)/(4.14). Thus, V̂ (N) from (3.4)
vanishes and Ŝ satisfies (NA).
On the other hand, in the model with price process S˜, the strategy
Ns,u(ω) = 1(ω=ω1, s=0, u≤T−1) + 1(ω=ω2, s=0, u≤t−1),
leading to
V˜ (N) = X˜0,T 1{ω1} + X˜0,t1{ω2},
is an arbitrage. Namely, one has X˜0,T (ω1) > 0 and X˜0,t(ω2) > 0 by (4.10) and (4.11), respec-
tively. Putting together, S does not satisfy (RLNA) in t.
Example 4.2 is based on two features: first, r2, the bad return in period t, is compensated by
the deferment of taxes across period t; and second, there exists the chance of a good return r2
that makes a purchase before t−1 profitable even if the stock has to be liquidated after period t.
This return is missing in the model with price process Ŝ on the event that the stock has to be
liquidated after period t. Put differently, the stochastic return in period t can be used to hedge
against the bad performance of the stock afterwards.
On the other hand, if the period t return never exceeded (1 − α)r, the addition of period t
would not provide any advantage. Especially one cannot construct deterministic examples for
the same boundaries as in (4.7).
Example 4.3 (Two long positions in the same stock that hedge each other). Let T = 3,
Ω = {ω1, ω2}, F0 = F1 = {∅,Ω}, and F2 = F3 = 2Ω, i.e., ω is revealed at time 2. We consider
the following stock price with parameters r¯, ε1, ε2 > 0 that still have to be specified: S0 = 1,
S1 = 1 + r¯,
S2(ω1) = (1 + r¯)(1 + r − ε1), S3(ω1) = (1 + r¯)(1 + r − ε1)(1 + r¯)
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and
S2(ω2) = (1 + r¯)(1 + r + ε2), S3(ω2) = 0.
The return r¯ ∈ (0, r) has to satisfy
(1 + r¯)(1 + r)(1− α) + α < (1 + (1− α)r)2, (4.16)
but
(1 + r¯)2(1 + r)(1− α) + α > (1 + (1− α)r)3. (4.17)
By Note 4.1(ii), the two conditions on r¯ can be satisfied simultaneously. From now on, we fix
such an r¯. Note that the gain of the short-term investment in period 2 reads
X1,2(ω) =
{ −(1− α)(1 + (1− α)r)(1 + r¯)ε1 : for ω = ω1
(1− α)(1 + (1− α)r)(1 + r¯)ε2 : for ω = ω2 (4.18)
We proceed by choosing ε1, ε2 > 0 both “small” such that
X1,2(ω1)X0,2(ω2)−X1,2(ω2)X0,3(ω1) = 0, (4.19)
X0,3(ω1) = (1 + r¯)(1 + r − ε1)(1 + r¯)(1− α) + α− (1 + (1− α)r)3 > 0, (4.20)
and
X0,2(ω2) = [(1 + r¯)(1 + r + ε2)(1− α) + α] (1 + (1− α)r)− (1 + (1− α)r)3 < 0. (4.21)
To achieve this, define F (ε1, ε2) as the LHS of (4.19). One has
∂2F (0, 0) = −(1− α)(1 + r¯)(1 + (1− α)r)
[
(1 + r¯)2(1 + r)(1− α) + α− (1 + (1− α)r)3] < 0.
Thus, the implicit function theorem yields the existence of a function f defined in a neighborhood
of 0 with F (ε1, f(ε1)) = 0 for all ε1 > 0 small enough. We choose ε1 > 0 small enough and
ε2 = f(ε1). By (4.16) and (4.17), the conditions (4.21), (4.20), and (4.19) can be satisfied
simultaneously.
We have constructed a model with two states and two self-financing and opposite investment
opportunities: a long-term investment that buys the stock at time 0 and sells it at time 3 if ω1
occurs or at time 2 if ω2 occurs and a short-term investment that buys the stock at time 1 and sells
it at time 2. All other investments lead to sure losses. Equation (4.19) is a no-arbitrage condition
ensuring that one of the two investment opportunities is redundant. Consider the strategy
N0,0 = N0,1 = 1, N0,2 = 1{ω1}, N1,1 = −X0,3(ω1)/X1,2(ω1), N1,2 = 0, and N2,2 = 0, (4.22)
in which X0,3(ω1) > 0 and −X1,2(ω1) > 0 by (4.20) and (4.18), respectively. The liquidation
value reads
V (N) = X0,31{ω1} +X0,21{ω2} + (−X0,3(ω1)/X1,2(ω1))X1,2,
which vanishes by (4.19). When buying one stock at time zero, −X0,3(ω1)/X1,2(ω1) stocks at
time one and following the liquidation rules from above, the after-tax gains of the two long stock
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positions cancel each other out, and the total gain after financing costs disappears for sure.
Finally, we give a detailed proof that the model satisfies (NA). For stocks purchased at time 0,
we have that
max
u=1,2,3
X0,u(ω1) = X0,3(ω1) > 0 and max
u=1,2,3
X0,u(ω2) = X0,2(ω2) < 0. (4.23)
Indeed, the former holds since X0,2(ω1) < 0 by (4.16) and X0,3(ω1) > 0 by (4.20). The latter
holds by X0,3(ω2) < X0,1(ω2) < X0,2(ω2) and (4.21). For stocks purchased at time 1, we get
max
u=2,3
X1,u(ω1) = X1,2(ω1) < 0 and max
u=2,3
X1,u(ω2) = X1,2(ω2) > 0. (4.24)
Here, X1,2(ω1) < 0 holds by (4.18) and X1,2(ω1) > X1,3(ω1) follows from (4.16), −ε1 < 0, and
Note 4.1(i). On the other hand, X1,2(ω2) > 0 by (4.18) and X1,3(ω2) < 0.
Now, let N be some arbitrary strategy. By (4.23) and
∑3
u=1(N0,u−1−N0,u) = N0,0, we have
the estimate
3∑
u=1
(N0,u−1 −N0,u)X0,u ≤ N0,0
(
X0,31{ω1} +X0,21{ω2}
)
.
With (4.24), we have an analogue estimate for the gains of purchases at time 1 and since
X2,3 < 0, we arrive at
V (N) =
2∑
s=0
3∑
u=s+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)Xs,u ≤ N0,0
(
X0,31{ω1} +X0,21{ω2}
)
+N1,1X1,2.
One has
V (N) ≤ N0,0
(
X0,31{ω1} +X0,21{ω2}
)
+N1,1X1,2
= N0,0X1,2
X0,3(ω1)
X1,2(ω1)
+N1,1X1,2
=
[
N0,0
X0,3(ω1)
X1,2(ω1)
+N1,1
]
X1,2, (4.25)
where the first equality holds by (4.19). Now, assume that V (N) ≥ 0. Since X1,2 can take both
a positive and a negative value, (4.25) implies that the deterministic prefactor vanishes, i.e.,
N0,0X0,3(ω1)/X1,2(ω1) +N1,1 = 0 and thus V (N) = 0. Consequently, the market satisfies (NA).
We have constructed an arbitrage-free model with two long positions in the same stock that
hedge each other. The key feature of Example 4.3 is that a bad return in period 2 is followed
by a good return in period 3 and vice versa. For a short-term investor, it is only worthwhile
to speculate in the return of period 2 (thus, the advance information about a good return in
period 3 cannot be used for an arbitrage). By contrast, for a long-term investor who already
buys the stock at time zero and accepts lower returns since she profits from the deferment of
taxes, the return of period 3 has a stronger impact. Thus, a long-term investor believing in this
stochastic model hopes for the bad return in period 2.
Such an example cannot exist in an arbitrage-free model without taxes because the difference
between long- and short-term investments disappears. This is shown in the following remark.
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Remark 4.4. Let (S, S) be the discounted discrete time bid-ask-price process of a risky stock in
a model without capital gains taxes. If the market enriched by a riskless bank account is arbitrage-
free, there exists a Q ∼ P and a Q-martingale S with S ≤ S ≤ S (for the result on general
probability spaces, see Corollary 2.9 in Grigoriev [12]). Then, for any dynamic strategy with
vanishing liquidation value, the gain process ϕ • S in the discounted shadow price also vanishes,
where ϕ denotes the predictable number of risky stocks. Indeed, since trading at price process S
is at least as favorable as at the bid-ask prices, one has Q(ϕ • ST ≥ 0) = 1. On the other hand,
a discrete time local martingale with nonnegative terminal value is a true martingale. Together
with ϕ • S0 = 0, one arrives at Q(ϕ • St = 0, t = 0, . . . , T ) = 1. However, this implies that each
individual share bought and sold by the dynamic strategy between 0 and T makes zero profit for
sure (after financing costs), and thus an effect as in Example 4.3 cannot occur.
An extension of the construction in Example 4.3 is also useful in the following example. Here,
we want to show that on an infinite probability space, no-arbitrage alone does not imply the
existence of a separating measure since the set of attainable terminal wealths does not need to
be closed regarding the convergence in probability.
Example 4.5 (No-arbitrage ; ∃ equivalent separating probability measure). Let T = 4 and
Ω = {ωn,1 | n ∈ N} ∪ {ωn,2 | n ∈ N}, F0 = F1 = {∅,Ω}, F2 = σ({{ωn,1, ωn,2} | n ∈ N}),
and F3 = F4 = 2Ω. This means that n is already revealed at time 2 and full information at
time 3. The stock price depends on parameters that still have to be specified and reads S0 = 1,
S1 = 1 + r1, S2 = (1 + r1)(1 + r),
S3(ωn,1) = (1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2 − εn,1), S4(ωn,1) = (1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2 − εn,1)(1 + r1)
and
S3(ωn,2) = (1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2 + εn,2), S4(ωn,2) = 0,
where r2 ∈ (0, r) is given by
(1 + r)(1 + r2)(1− α) + α = (1 + (1− α)r)2.
In addition, we fix an r1 > 0 satisfying
(1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2)(1− α) + α < (1 + (1− α)r)3, (4.26)
but
(1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2)(1 + r1)(1− α) + α > (1 + (1− α)r)4. (4.27)
By Note 4.1(ii), such an r1 exists. Observe that the difference between the LHS and the RHS of
(4.27) corresponds to X0,4(ωn,1) if εn,1 is ignored. The same holds for (4.26) and X0,3(ωn,i)/(1+
(1− α)r) if εn,i, i = 1, 2, is ignored.
Note 4.1(i) applied to R = r (which means that r¯ = r2) and R
′ = (1 + r)(1 + r2)− 1 yields
that (1 + r)(1 + r2)
2(1− α) + α > (1 + (1− α)r)3 and thus by (4.26)
r1 < r2. (4.28)
We proceed by specifying the sequence (εn,2)n∈N ⊂ R+ \ {0}. Let ε2 > 0 be small enough such
that (1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2 + ε2)(1 − α) + α < (1 + (1 − α)r)3 and r2 + ε2 < r, which exists by
(4.26) and r2 < r. Then, define εn,2 := (1/n) ∧ ε2 for all n ∈ N. This choice ensures that
εn,2 ↓ 0, n→∞, sup
n∈N
X0,3(ωn,2) < 0, X1,3(ωn,2) > 0, X2,3(ωn,2) < 0, ∀n ∈ N. (4.29)
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Note that
X1,3(ω) =
{ −(1 + r1)(1 + r)(1− α)(1 + (1− α)r)εn,1 : for ω = ωn,1
(1 + r1)(1 + r)(1− α)(1 + (1− α)r)εn,2 : for ω = ωn,2
To complete the construction of the stock price process, it remains to specify the se-
quence (εn,1)n∈N ⊂ R+ \ {0}. The goal is that the conditions
X0,4(ωn,1) > 0, X1,3(ωn,1) < 0, ∀n ∈ N, (4.30)
and
X1,3(ωn,2)X0,4(ωn,1)− 2X1,3(ωn,1)X0,3(ωn,2) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N, (4.31)
are satisfied. To achieve this, we firstly choose an ε1 > 0 satisfying (1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2 −
ε1)(1 + r1)(1−α) +α > (1 + (1−α)r)4, which exists by (4.27). Then, we consider the functions
fn given by
fn(ε) := X1,3(ωn,2)
[
(1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2 − ε)(1 + r1)(1− α) + α− (1 + (1− α)r)4
]
+2X0,3(ωn,2)(1 + r1)(1 + r)(1− α)(1 + (1− α)r)ε, n ∈ N. (4.32)
fn(ε) is the LHS of (4.31) if the number εn,1 entering in X0,4(ωn,1) and X1,3(ωn,1) is replaced by
the variable ε. For every n ∈ N, the factor after X1,3(ωn,2) > 0 in (4.32) converges to a positive
number by (4.27) and the factor after X0,3(ωn,2) to zero for ε ↓ 0. Thus, one has fn(ε) > 0 for
ε > 0 small enough. Consequently,
εn,1 := sup{1/k | k ∈ N, 1/k < ε1, and fn(1/k) > 0}
is positive and the condition (4.31) is satisfied. By the choice of ε1 and εn,1 ≤ ε1, one has
X0,4(ωn,1) > 0 for all n ∈ N. In addition, one has X1,3(ωn,1) < 0 for all n ∈ N and thus (4.30).
Let us explain the main idea of the construction. As in Example 4.3, there is a long- and
a short-term investment in the stock that are in the opposite direction. For the long-term
investment, the stock is already purchased at time 0. The short-term investment is between 1
and 3, but the return between 1 and 2 equals the riskless interest rate r. It simply provides the
opportunity to defer taxes beyond time 2 if the stock is still held in the portfolio, but without a
loss if one decides against it at time 2. The long-term investor hopes for the event {ωn,1 | n ∈ N}
and the short-term investor for {ωn,2 | n ∈ N}. In contrast to Example 4.3, the investments do
not only cancel each other out, but one can achieve a systematic profit if one holds a suitable
ratio. The problem is that the profit and the loss of the short-term investment disappear with
n → ∞. Thus, depending on n, one needs to buy more and more stocks at time 1, but n is not
revealed before time 2. On the other hand, by buying the stock at time 2 and doing without the
benefits from the deferment of gains accrued in period 2, one makes a loss for sure. Without
the knowledge of n, stocks can be bought ahead at time 1 and – if they are not needed – sold
without any loss at time 2. This procedure generates an approximate arbitrage by buying ahead
more and more stocks at time 1 and selling the stocks which are not needed at time 2. The
remaining risk that there are not enough short-term stocks in the portfolio at time 2 disappears
in the limit.
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Step 1: Let us first show that the model satisfies (NA). For stock purchases at time 0, we
have that
max
u=1,2,3,4
X0,u(ωn,1) = X0,4(ωn,1), max
u=1,2,3,4
X0,u(ωn,2) = X0,3(ωn,2), ∀n ∈ N. (4.33)
Indeed, X0,4(ωn,1) > 0 holds by (4.30), but X0,1 < X0,2 < 0 by (4.28) and X0,3(ωn,1) < 0 by
(4.26). For ωn,2, we have that X0,4(ωn,2) < X0,1 < X0,2 < X0,3(ωn,2). Here, the last inequality
follows from εn,2 > 0 and Note 4.1(i) applied to R = r and R
′ = (1 + r1)(1 + r)− 1.
For stock purchases at time 1, we get
X1,2 = 0, X1,3 > X1,4, (4.34)
in which X1,3(ωn,1) > X1,4(ωn,1) follows from (4.26), −εn,1 < 0, and Note 4.1(i). Later purchases
lead to sure losses, i.e.,
X2,3 < 0, X2,4 < 0, and X3,4 < 0, (4.35)
where X2,3(ωn,2) < 0 is ensured by (4.29).
Now, let N be some arbitrary strategy. By (4.33) and
∑4
u=1(N0,u−1−N0,u) = N0,0, we have
the estimate
4∑
u=1
(N0,u−1 −N0,u)X0,u ≤ N0,0
(
X0,41A +X0,31Ω\A
)
, where A := {ωn,1 | n ∈ N}.
By (4.34), we get the estimate
4∑
u=2
(N1,u−1 −N1,u)X1,u =
4∑
u=3
(N1,u−1 −N1,u)X1,u ≤ N1,2X1,3.
Finally, by (4.35), one has
∑4
u=3(N2,u−1 −N2,u)X2,u ≤ 0 and N3,3X3,4 ≤ 0. Putting together,
V (N) =
3∑
s=0
4∑
u=s+1
(Ns,u−1 −Ns,u)Xs,u ≤ N0,0
(
X0,41A +X0,31Ω\A
)
+N1,2X1,3. (4.36)
Now, assume that V (N) ≥ 0 and let us show that this implies V (N) = 0. Since N1,2 is bounded
from above by the real number N1,1, X1,3(ωn,2) = (1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 − α)(1 + (1 − α)r)εn,2 → 0
for n → ∞ by (4.29), and supn∈NX0,3(ωn,2) < 0, we conclude from the non-negativity of the
RHS of (4.36) on Ω \A that N0,0 = 0. From X1,3(ωn,1) < 0 for all n ∈ N and the non-negativity
of the RHS of (4.36) on A, it follows that the F2-measurable nonnegative random variable N1,2
vanishes. We arrive at V (N) ≤ 0, which means that there cannot be an arbitrage.
Step 2: Consider the sequence of strategies (Nm)m∈N given by
Nm0,0 = N
m
0,1 = N
m
0,2 = 1, N
m
0,3 = 1A,
Nm1,1 = m, N
m
1,2(ωn,i) = (−X0,4(ωn,1)/X1,3(ωn,1)) ∧m, n ∈ N, i = 1, 2, Nm1,3 = 0,
and Ns,u = 0 for s ≥ 2. By X1,2 = 0, (4.36) holds with equality for Nm. For ω = ωn,1, the
long- and short-term investments cancel each other out if m ≥ |X0,4(ωn,1)/X1,3(ωn,1)|, and the
profit in the long-term investment X0,4(ωn,1) > 0 dominates if m < |X0,4(ωn,1)/X1,3(ωn,1)|. This
means that V (Nm)1A = N
m
0,0X0,41A +N
m
1,2X1,31A ≥ 0.
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For ω = ωn,2 and if m ≥ |X0,4(ωn,1)/X1,3(ωn,1)|, we get
V (Nm)(ωn,2) = X0,3(ωn,2)− X0,4(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,2)
≥ 1
2
X0,4(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,2)− X0,4(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,2)
= −1
2
X0,4(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,2) > 0,
where the first inequality holds by by (4.31). For ω = ωn,2 and if m < |X0,4(ωn,1)/X1,3(ωn,1)|,
one has by X1,3(ωn,2) > 0 the trivial estimate V (N
m)(ωn,2) ≥ X0,3(ωn,2), that does however not
ensure non-negativity. Putting together, one obtains that
V (Nm) ≥ V (Nm)1Ω\A
≥ −1
2
∞∑
n=1
X0,4(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,2)1(m≥|X0,4(ωn,1)/X1,3(ωn,1)|)1{ωn,2}
+
∞∑
n=1
X0,3(ωn,2)1(m<|X0,4(ωn,1)/X1,3(ωn,1)|)1{ωn,2}. (4.37)
The RHS of (4.37) converges pointwise to
−1
2
∞∑
n=1
X0,4(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,1)
X1,3(ωn,2)1{ωn,2} ∈ L0+(Ω,F , P ) \ {0} (4.38)
for m → ∞. This means that there exists an approximate arbitrage. Putting together, for A :=
{ηT ∈ L0(Ω,F , P ) | (η,N) self-financing} − L0+(Ω,F , P ), one has that
A ∩ L0+(Ω,F , P ) = {0}, but A ∩ L0+(Ω,F , P ) ) {0}, (4.39)
where A denotes the closure of A regarding the convergence in probability.
A minimal condition on a separating probability measure Q ∼ P is that
EQ(ζ) ≤ 0, ∀ζ ∈ A ∩ L∞(Ω,F , P ). (4.40)
Since the sequence (V (Nm))m∈N is uniformly bounded from below by
inf
n∈N
X0,3(ωn,2) =
[
(1 + r1)(1 + r)(1 + r2)(1− α) + α− (1 + (1− α)r)3
]
(1 + (1− α)r) > −∞,
it immediately follows from (4.38) and Fatou’s lemma that (4.40) cannot hold.
The construction in Example 4.5 can also be used to establish a proportional transaction
costs model with 3 assets which satisfies (NA), although an equivalent separating probability
measure does not exist. This means that Grigoriev’s theorem cannot be extended to dimension 3
(see Theorem 1.2 and the discussion in Section 5 of [12]).
Example 4.6 (Counterexample for an extension of Grigoriev’s theorem to dimension 3). Let
T = 2, Ω = {ωn,1 | n ∈ N} ∪ {ωn,2 | n ∈ N}, F0 = {∅,Ω}, F1 = σ({{ωn,1, ωn,2} | n ∈ N}),
and F2 = 2Ω. This means that n is already revealed at time 1 and full information at time 2.
Besides a bank account that does not pay interest, there are two risky stocks with the bid-ask-price
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processes (S1, S
1
) and (S2, S
2
). The initial prices satisfy S10 = S
1
0 = S
2
0 = S
2
0 = 1. At time 1,
stock 2 can be sold at price 1, i.e., S21 = 1, and other prices are sufficiently unfavorable to avoid
trades, namely S11 = 0, S
1
1 = 3, and S
2
1 = 3. The terminal prices are
S12(ωn,1) = S
1
2(ωn,1) = 3, S
1
2(ωn,2) = S
1
2(ωn,2) = 0,
S22(ωn,1) = S
2
2(ωn,1) = 1− 1/n, S22(ωn,2) = S22(ωn,2) = 1 + 1/n, n ∈ N.
This means that at times 0 and 2 we have a frictionless market and at time 1 one can only sell
the stock 2 (at the same price as at time 0, but after observing n).
Step 1: Let us show (NA). It is sufficient to consider strategies that are static apart from
possible sells of stock 2 at time 1. The liquidation values dominate those of other strategies, and
for zero initial capital they can be written as
V :=
∞∑
n=1
(
2ϕ11 −
1
n
(
ϕ21 + ∆ϕ
2
2
))
1{ωn,1} +
∞∑
n=1
(
−ϕ11 +
1
n
(
ϕ21 + ∆ϕ
2
2
))
1{ωn,2}, (4.41)
where ϕ11, ϕ
2
1 are arbitrary real numbers and ∆ϕ
2
2 is a non-positive F1-measurable random vari-
able. Following the standard notation is discrete time finance, the quantities denote the amounts
of stocks in the portfolio. Assume that V ≥ 0. By ∆ϕ22 ≤ 0 and 1/n → 0 for n → ∞,
the non-negativity of the second sum in (4.41) implies ϕ11 ≤ 0. On the other hand, one has
ϕ11 ≤
(
ϕ21 + ∆ϕ
2
2
)
/n ≤ 2ϕ11. Putting together, we obtain ϕ11 = 0 and thus ϕ21 + ∆ϕ22 = 0 as well
as V = 0. This means that the market satisfies (NA).
Step 2: On the other hand, an “approximate arbitrage” is given by the se-
quence (ϕ1,m1 , ϕ
2,m
1 ,∆ϕ
2,m
2 )m∈N with ϕ
1,m
1 = 1, ϕ
2,m
1 = m, and ∆ϕ
2,m
2 = −(m −
n)+ on {ωn,1, ωn,2}. The corresponding liquidation values read
∑∞
n=1
(
2− n∧mn
)
1{ωn,1} +∑∞
n=1
(−1 + n∧mn ) 1{ωn,2}, m ∈ N, which converges pointwise to 1{ωn,1 | n∈N} for m → ∞. This
yields (4.39).
By Proposition 3.2.6 of Kabanov and Safarian [17], A ∩ L0+(Ω,F , P ) 6= {0} already implies
that a so-called consistent price system cannot exist (this means that one need not make use of
the fact that the above sequence leads to bounded losses and thus Fatou’s lemma is applicable).
Example 3.1 of Schachermayer [23] demonstrates the same property in a one-period model
with 4 assets. The main idea of our example is the same as in [23]. Roughly speaking, there is
an asset for which the need is initially unknown and unbounded, and after the need is revealed,
it can be sold at its initial purchasing price. Thus, one buys it ahead more and more, and
the limit of this strategy does not exist. On the other hand, the “currency example” in [23]
is based on the property that no asset can play the role of a bank account, i.e., of an asset
that is involved in every transaction. Indeed, in one-period transaction costs models with a
bank account, Grigoriev’s theorem holds for arbitrary many assets; namely, these models can
be written as frictionless markets with short-selling constraints, and thus the set of attainable
liquidation values is closed regarding the convergence in probability. This is shown by Napp [19]
(see Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 4.2 therein).
Remark 4.7 (Wash sales). From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting to observe that (NA)
in the sense of Definition 2.1 does not follow from (NA) in the same model but under the
prohibition of wash sales. Indeed, in the spirit of Example 4.3, one can construct an example
with |Ω| = 4 in which the long-term investment and two one-period investments in two subsequent
periods (with all 4 combinations of good/bad one-period returns) can be combined to an arbitrage.
In the first of these periods, the bad return has to become negative (and not only smaller than r).
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Through enlarging of the time horizon, this can be achieved without violating the other properties.
Subsequently, the arbitrage may disappear if a wash sell between the two periods is forbidden,
i.e., one cannot realize the loss in the first period and invest in the second period. We leave the
construction of the example as an exercise for the interested reader.
Nevertheless, for the arbitrage theory with a single non-shortable risky stock, the effect of the
prohibition of wash sales is marginal. This can be seen in Example 4.2, in which the arbitrage
strategy that exists under the larger lower bound for the return in period t does not make use of
wash sales.
5 Relation to models with proportional transaction costs
It is interesting to note that the model of Dybvig and Koo [8] can be written as a model
with proportional transaction costs by introducing several fictitious securities; namely, for every
i = 0, . . . , T − 1, we consider a security i that can be bought at the ask-price process Si and
sold at the bid-price process Si. In fact, security i models the purchase of the original stock at
time i and a later liquidation. This means that we put
S
i
i := Si, S
i
t := St − α(St − Si), t = i+ 1, . . . , T, and Si =∞, Si = −∞ otherwise. (5.1)
Note that a short position in security i cannot be closed after time i. This forces the investor to
hold only nonnegative numbers of the securities.
Proposition 5.1. Let the assumptions of Proposition 2.15 be satisfied.
(i) The set of attainable terminal wealths A := {ηT ∈ L0(Ω,F , P ) | (η,N) self-financing} −
L0+(Ω,F , P ) is closed regarding the convergence in probability.
(ii) There exists a Q ∼ P with bounded dQ/dP such that EQ(Si) <∞ for all i = 0, 1, . . . , T
and
EQ
(
Sτ − α(Sτ − Si)
(1 + (1− α)r)τ
)
≤ EQ
(
Si
(1 + (1− α)r)i
)
∀i = 0, . . . , T − 1, τ ∈ Ti, (5.2)
where Ti denotes the set of {i, . . . , T}-valued stopping times.
Proposition 5.2. Let |Ω| < ∞. The model satisfies (NA) iff there exists a Q ∼ P such that
(5.2) holds.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Ad (i): The tax model can be identified with the transaction costs
model (5.1). Let us show that it satisfies the “robust no-arbitrage” property for models with
transaction costs, as introduced in Definition 1.9 of Schachermayer [23]. In the special case that
we consider here, this means that if prices are finite, one has to find slightly more favorable
prices under which the model still satisfies (NA). Define
C
i
i := Si
(
1− 1
3
α(1− α)r
(1 + (1− α)r)T−i
)
, Cit := St − α(St − Si) +
1
3
α(1− α)rSi,
i = 0, . . . , T − 1, t = i + 1, . . . , T and again C = −∞, C = ∞ otherwise. The no-arbitrage
property of (C,C) follows along the lines of the proof of Proposition 2.15, especially by an
inspection of estimation (3.25). Then, by Theorem 2.1 of [23], it follows that A is closed regarding
the convergence in probability.
Ad (ii): With (i), the proof of existence of a separating measure is straightforward. For the
convenience of the reader, we briefly repeat the well-known arguments (cf. Schachermayer [22]
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for an easily-accessible overview). First, we define the probability measure P˜ ∼ P by dP˜ /dP =
c/(1 + S0 + . . .+ ST ) and c := 1/EP (1/(1 + S0 + . . .+ ST )), for which one has
Si ∈ L1(Ω,F , P˜ ), i = 0, . . . , T. (5.3)
(i) and Yan’s theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 3.1 in [23]) imply the existence of a probability
measure Q with positive and bounded dQ/dP˜ such that
EQ(η) ≤ 0 ∀η ∈ A ∩ L1(Ω,F , P˜ ). (5.4)
Consider (Xs,u)s<u from (3.1). For any self-financing strategy (η,N), the liquidation value ηT
is given by (3.2). For i ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, τ ∈ Ti, we define Ni,t := 1{τ>t} and Ns,t = 0 for s 6= i
that yields ηT = V (N) = Xi,τ for the corresponding self-financing (η,N), with the convention
Xi,i := 0. (5.3) implies Xi,τ ∈ L1(Ω,F , P˜ ). By (5.4), it follows that EQ(Xi,τ ) ≤ 0 for all
i = 0, . . . , T , τ ∈ Ti. Dividing Xi,τ by the constant (1 + (1− α)r)T yields (5.2). At this point, it
is crucial that the interest rate is deterministic. In addition, note that dQ/dP = dQ/dP˜ ·dP˜ /dP
is bounded. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. On a finite probability space, (NA) is equivalent to the existence of a
probability measure Q ∼ P with EQ(ηT ) ≤ 0 for all ηT from (3.2), see, e.g., again Theorem 3.1
in [23] for the non-trivial direction. As argued above, the latter implies that
EQ(Xi,τ ) ≤ 0 ∀i = 0, . . . , T − 1, τ ∈ Ti, (5.5)
and it remains to show equivalence. (5.5) yields the existence of Q-martingales (M it )t=i,...,T with
M ii = 0 and M
i
t ≥ Xi,t, t = i+ 1, . . . , T. (5.6)
Indeed, let M i be the martingale part of the Snell-envelope of the process (Xi,t)t=i,...,T . With
representation (3.2) and (5.6), it follows that
ηT =
T−1∑
i=0
T∑
t=i+1
(Ni,t−1 −Ni,t)Xi,t
≤
T−1∑
i=0
T∑
t=i+1
(Ni,t−1 −Ni,t)M it
=
T−1∑
i=0
T∑
t=i+1
Ni,t−1M it −
T−1∑
i=0
T+1∑
t=i+2
Ni,t−1M it−1
=
T−1∑
i=0
T∑
t=i+2
Ni,t−1(M it −M it−1) +
T−1∑
i=0
Ni,iM
i
i+1,
where for the last equality we use that Ni,T = 0. Since Ni,t−1 is Ft−1-measurable and M i is a
Q-martingale with M ii = 0, it follows that EQ(ηT ) ≤ 0. 
6 Conclusion
In models with taxes, no-one-period-arbitrage is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
dynamic no-arbitrage. Thus, we introduce the robust local no-arbitrage (RLNA) condition as the
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weakest local condition on stochastic stock price returns which guarantees dynamic no-arbitrage.
(RLNA) can be verified under a similar dichotomy condition as no-one-period arbitrage (see
(2.7) vs. (2.3)). By comparing the boundary κt,T under which the stochastic return in period t
has to fall with positive possibility to exclude arbitrage with the riskless interest rate r one
can estimate how non-local the no-arbitrage property is. The difference between κt,T and r is
quite remarkable since for T − t → ∞, κt,T tends to −α + (1 − α)2r, i.e., for r  α, the just
tolerable potential loss in the stock coincides with the previous stock price times the tax rate.
This refers to the extreme case in which the stock’s purchasing price is negligible compared to
its current price and in addition the investor can defer accrued taxes forevermore. Thus, she
tolerates possible losses that are only slightly smaller than the taxes that she has to pay if the
stock is liquidated. Example 4.2 explains the difference between κt,T and r by the possibility that
the current stock return can be used as a hedging instrument against the future stock return.
The puzzling phenomenon that two long positions in the same stock can hedge each other also
has consequences for the existence of a separating measure in an arbitrage-free market. The
phenomenon cannot occur in arbitrage-free frictionless markets or markets with proportional
transactions costs. We show that in the tax model with a bank account and one risky stock,
no-arbitrage alone does not imply the existence of an equivalent separating probability measure
(see Example 4.5). This is in contrast to models with proportional transaction costs for which
Grigoriev’s theorem shows the opposite. Furthermore, as a by-product of our analysis, one
obtains an example showing that Grigoriev’s theorem cannot be extended to dimension 3 (see
Example 4.6).
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